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Comment
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA: The
Search for Meaningful Regulation of Interstate
Pollution Under the Clean Air Act
Bryan Dooley*
In August 2011, the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) promulgated the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
(also known as the Transport Rule or CAIR Replacement
Rule),1 which is the EPA’s most recent attempt to regulate
interstate air pollution under the “good neighbor provision” of
the Clean Air Act.2 The rule set emission-reduction
requirements for twenty-eight eastern states, primarily
targeting fossil-fuel-fired power plants, and simultaneously
issued federal implementation plans to implement the
reductions in each affected state.3 A number of state and local
governments, industry groups, and labor organizations opposed
to the rule petitioned for its review.4 On August 21, 2012, a
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion vacating the
rule, holding that the EPA had exceeded its congressionally
granted authority under the Clean Air Act.5 The court denied a
petition by the EPA for rehearing of the case en banc.6

© 2013 Bryan Dooley
* J.D.Candidate (2014), University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to thank Professor Brad Karkkainen for his help and guidance and
the staff and editors of MJLST for their work to improve this Comment.
1. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine
Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg.
48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97)
[hereinafter CSAPR].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006); see also EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
3. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 11.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 7.
6. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, EME Homer City Generation,
L.P. v. EPA, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2013); D.C. Circuit Declines to
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EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA illustrates the
difficulty the EPA faces as it attempts to formulate effective
and efficient regulation of cross-border environmental harm
within the boundaries created by the Clean Air Act. The
decision imposes new limitations on the EPA’s ability to enact
and enforce regional solutions to what is a fundamentally
regional problem.7 Meanwhile, downwind states continue to
bear the public health and regulatory burdens resulting from
upwind contributions to poor air quality.8
This Comment will analyze the implications of EME
Homer City Generation for future attempts at meaningful
regulation of interstate air pollution. Part I will briefly examine
the historical failures of federal regulation to adequately
address the problem and recent attempts to regulate under the
Act. Part II will discuss the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, the
EME Homer City Generation decision, and prospects for future
regulation in detail. This Comment concludes that the EPA
should appeal the decision to the Supreme Court and it should
be overturned. If the decision is allowed to stand, amendment
of the Clean Air Act is necessary to allow regulation of
interstate air pollution that is effective and not unnecessarily
burdensome.
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE AIR POLLUTION
The Supreme Court began hearing common-law disputes
involving interstate air pollution in the early twentieth
century.9 Courts—though frequently reluctant to tackle the
factual complexity and uncertainty inherent in evaluating the
competing scientific and technical claims involved in such
cases—remained the primary avenue for states seeking

Rehear Decision Vacating EPA Cross-State Air Rule, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan.
25, 2013), http://www.bna.com/dc-circuit-declines-n17179872026/.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.
8. Protecting Clean Air and Public Health, CARPER.SENATE.GOV,
http://www.carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/protecting-clean-air-and-publichealth-in-congress (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
9. See Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal
for an Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 49, 62–68 (2008) (discussing early cases implicating interstate
environmental harm).
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abatement of interstate environmental harm until passage of
the substantial environmental legislation of the 1970s.10
The federal government took its first tentative steps into
the realm of air quality regulation in 1955, its role limited to
providing assistance in research, training, and technical
matters to state and local authorities.11 Congress gradually
expanded this role through a series of legislative acts during
the 1960s,12 including the passage of the Clean Air Act of
1963.13 The Act authorized expansion of research efforts and
grants of federal funds to state environmental quality
agencies.14 It also allowed direct federal intervention, via
litigation on behalf of the United States, for abatement of
interstate pollution where other procedures outlined in the
legislation failed to produce adequate corrective action at the
state level.15 The Air Quality Act of 1967 created additional
federal supervisory and enforcement responsibilities, but left
determinations as to acceptable levels of air pollution and how
and when they should be realized largely to state discretion.16
While pre-1970 legislation included some limited room for
federal enforcement, it addressed disputes involving interstate
pollution primarily by providing for interstate conferences
intended to promote cooperative state action, with the federal
government acting as a mediator and facilitator.17
10. See id. at 69.
[T]he factfinding process we are asked to undertake is, to say the
least, formidable. . . . Indeed, Ohio is raising factual questions that
are essentially ones of first impression to the scientists. The notion
that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most competent
Special Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to
unravel these complexities is, to say the least, unrealistic. Nor would
it suffice to impose on Ohio an unusually high standard of proof. That
might serve to mitigate our personal difficulties in seeking a just
result that comports with sound judicial administration, but would
not lessen the complexity of the task of preparing responsibly to
exercise our judgment, or the serious drain on the resources of this
Court it would entail.
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1971).
11. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63 (1975).
12. See id. at 63–64.
13. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
14. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
15. § 5, 77 Stat. at 396–99.
16. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967); see
Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
17. Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate
Ozone Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
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A. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 AND 1977
Dissatisfaction with the failure of the previous decade’s
legislation to spur meaningful progress toward cleaner air
prompted Congress to enact the Clean Air Amendments of
1970.18 The amendments called for a more active federal role
and established the backbone of the modern regulatory scheme,
under which the EPA sets uniform, health-based standards for
harmful pollutants (National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
or NAAQS).19 The legislation required states to submit a state
implementation plan (SIP) for implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement of NAAQS for each air quality control region
within the state and authorized the EPA to impose a federal
implementation plan (FIP) if a SIP is not submitted or the EPA
deems it unsatisfactory.20
The 1970 amendments addressed the problem of interstate
air pollution in section 110(a)(2)(E), the earliest incarnation of
the “good neighbor provision.”21 The provision required that
SIPs contain “adequate provisions for intergovernmental
cooperation, including measures necessary to insure that
emissions of air pollutants from sources located in any air
quality control region will not interfere with the attainment or
maintenance” of NAAQS in out-of-state areas.22 In spite of the
statute’s “measures necessary to insure” language, the EPA
interpreted the section as intended by Congress primarily to
facilitate communication and information-sharing.23 Like the
ineffectual pre-1970 system of conferences, the EPA’s rule
implementing this interpretation relied in large part on the
voluntary cooperation of states.24 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld this interpretation
against a challenge by environmental groups.25
In retrospect, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 may have
1, 13–14 (1996).
18. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; see
Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
19. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 109 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409 (2006)).
20. Id. § 110 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006)).
21. Id. § 110(a)(2)(E) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006)).
22. Id.
23. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 15.
24. Id. at 13–14.
25. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 692–93 (8th
Cir. 1973); see Wilcox, supra note 17, at 15.
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actually encouraged states to export air pollution. The federal
framework created an incentive for states, which had not
previously imposed extensive regulation on polluters but were
now pushed to do so, to externalize both the negative
environmental effects of air pollution and the new regulatory
burdens created by the Act.26 In the absence of any meaningful
regulatory disincentive, some states designed SIPs to allow
polluters to decrease their local environmental impact by
building taller exhaust stacks—which disperse pollutants more
widely—rather than reducing emissions.27 Judicial rejection of
the EPA’s approval of one such SIP in 1974 prompted the EPA
to issue regulations limiting the benefit of tall stacks toward
achievement of regulatory goals.28 Congress directly addressed
this issue in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.29 The
amendments denied credit toward required air pollution
controls for the portion of any stack constructed after
enactment of the Clean Air Act of 1970 extending above the
height called for by “good engineering practice,” as defined by
the EPA.30
In an effort to reroute the course of regulation under the
EPA and judicial interpretation, the 1970 amendments also
contained a significant revision of section 110(a)(2)(E), the good
neighbor provision.31 The new language required SIPs to
contain provisions “prohibiting any stationary source within
the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which
will . . . prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State”
of NAAQS.32 The section’s textual limitation to individual

26. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2351–52 (1996).
27. Id. At least fifteen SIPs submitted in response to the initial NAAQS
contained such provisions. The number of stacks taller than 500 feet increased
from two in 1970 to more than 180 in 1985, with twenty-three at least 1000
feet tall. Id. at 2351–53.
28. Id. at 2354.
29. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 121, 91 Stat.
685, 721–22 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (2006)). Among other things,
the 1977 amendments also added separate, specific regulatory requirements
for areas designated nonattainment and those in attainment of NAAQS, key
elements of the modern regulatory regime. Id. §§ 127, 129 (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470, 7502 note (2006)).
30. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 121 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7423 (2006)).
31. See Wilcox, supra note 17, at 18.
32. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 108 (current version at 42 U.S.C.

DOOLEY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

898

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/12/2013 12:03 PM

[Vol. 14:2

stationary sources and failure to define key words such as
“prevent” again left difficult decisions as to how the language
could and should be applied.33 As a result, the amended
language ultimately granted little relief to downwind states.34
The amendments further attempted to address interstate
pollution with the addition of section 126, which contained two
important provisions.35 Section 126(a) required upwind states
to give notice and disclose certain information related to
proposed new or modified stationary sources expected to
“significantly contribute to levels of air pollution” in excess of
NAAQS in out-of-state areas.36 This notice provision provided
downwind states with emissions data that would otherwise be
difficult to obtain and allowed states that might be adversely
affected by proposed projects to mount early challenges.37
Section 126(b) created a new enforcement mechanism, under
which states could petition the EPA “for a finding that any
major source emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation
of the prohibition of section 110(a)(2)(E)(i).”38 Upon such a
finding, section 126(c) granted the EPA authority to block
construction of a proposed new or modified source or to shut
down an existing source within three months.39 A combination
of technological limitations on the ability of states to trace
quantifiable amounts of pollution to a single out-of-state
source, statutory limitations on the types of sources subject to
enforcement, and the EPA reticence, however, made the new
enforcement mechanism effectively useless.40 No state
effectively petitioned the EPA for redress under section 126
until 1998, eight years after substantial revisions to relevant
portions of the Act in 1990.41
§ 7410(a)(2)(D) (2011)).
33. See Wilcox, supra note 17, at 19–22 (discussing EPA and judicial
interpretation of the amended section 110(a)(2)(E)).
34. Id. at 22–24.
35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 123 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7426 (2006)).
36. Id.
37. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 23.
38. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 123 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7426 (2006)).
39. Id.
40. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 23–27.
41. Hall, supra note 9, at 72; see generally Wilcox, supra note 17, at 24–27
(discussing judicial challenges to the EPA’s denial of state petitions under
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B. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 contained
numerous significant changes to the statute, most of which are
beyond the scope of this Comment.42 These changes included
new programs aimed squarely at the issue of regional pollution.
First, the amendments established Title IV, an expansive
program intended to mitigate the harmful environmental
effects of acid rain.43 Title IV targets emissions of sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxides, which are the primary contributors to the
formation of acid rain.44 It regulates electrical utilities, which
were responsible for seventy percent of national emissions
when Congress enacted the 1990 amendments.45 The program
regulates sulfur dioxides through a market-based cap-andtrade system, under which utility generators receive a set
number of allowances each year permitting emission of one ton
of sulfur dioxide during the year.46 A regulated source can
comply by reducing emissions to match its number of
allowances, purchasing allowances for additional emissions, or
reducing more than its necessary emissions and either selling
excess allowances to another source or “banking” them for later
use.47
Second, among a number of new provisions aimed at ozone
pollution, the amendments established an “ozone transport
region,” comprised of eleven Northeast states and the District
of Columbia,48 and allowed for establishment of additional
transport regions.49 States included in ozone-transport regions
section 126 and the resulting development of the relevant statutory
interpretation).
42. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399.
43. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651–51o (2006)).
44. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(2), (b) (2006).
45. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the
Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide
Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 319 (2001).
46. Overview—The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, EPA,
http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa_overview.html#titleIV (last updated Dec. 19, 2008).
47. Swift, supra note 45, at 320–21. Sources that emit in excess of their
allowances are subject to a $2,000-per-ton penalty; must offset excess
emissions, generally during the following year; and receive reduced future
allowances equal to their excess emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (a)–(c) (2006).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (2006).
49. Id. § 7506a.
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must adopt specified measures targeting ozone precursors as
SIP provisions.50 Regional commissions, by a majority vote of
governors of member states, may also petition the EPA to
require additional control measures.51 If the EPA approves a
recommended control measure after a notice and comment
period, the statute requires all member states to revise their
SIPs to include the measure.52
The 1990 amendments also altered the existing provisions
governing interstate pollution, including the good neighbor
provision (section 110(a)(2)(D) of the amended Act).53 The
amended provision applies to “any source or other type of
emissions activity within the State”54 that will emit pollutants
in amounts that “contribute significantly to nonattainment in,
or interfere with maintenance by, any other State.”55 Congress
expanded the enforcement section of section 126 to allow states
to petition the EPA for a finding that “any major source or
group of stationary sources emits or would emit any air
pollutant in violation of the prohibition of section
7410(a)(2)(D)(ii).”56
Congress has set strict limitations on judicial review of
some EPA decisions under the Clean Air Act. First, section
307(b)(1) requires a petition for judicial review to be filed
within sixty days of publication of a final rule in the Federal
Register.57 Second, section 307(d)(7)(B) restricts eligibility for
judicial review of a rule or procedure to those objections “raised
with reasonable specificity during the period for public
comment . . . .”58
50. Id. § 7511c(b).
51. Id. § 7511c(c).
52. Id.
53. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §101(b), 104
Stat. 2399, 2404 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006)).
54. Id.; cf. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108,
91 Stat. 685, 693 (1977) (applying only to “any stationary source”).
55. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §101(b); cf. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977 § 108 (applying to emissions “prevent attainment or
maintenance by any other State”). Congress may have intended to codify the
interpretation of the 1977 Act’s “prevent” language developed by EPA through
the section 126 petition cases. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 31–32.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (emphasis added).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). This section also establishes the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as the exclusive forum for
initial review of many EPA actions pursuant to the Act. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B).
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The 1990 amendments suggest that Congress was aware of
and intended to address historical difficulties of interstate air
quality regulation under the Clean Air Act. The EPA has
previously made two substantial attempts to promulgate rules
under the revised good neighbor provision.59 Both were
challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, with the disputes centering
largely around the EPA’s interpretation of the phrase
“contribute significantly.”60
C. THE NOX SIP CALL AND THE CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULE
1. The NOx SIP Call and Michigan v. U.S. EPA
In 1998 the EPA promulgated a rule requiring twenty-two
states and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs for
ozone61 due to a finding of failure to meet the obligations
imposed by the good neighbor provision.62 In order to determine
which states were “significantly contributing” to downwind
ozone pollution under the good neighbor provision, the EPA
first relied on environmental modeling.63 Rather than base its
determination purely on emission contributions indicated by
modeling, however, the EPA also examined the types of
pollution sources found in each state and the amount of
pollution that could be reduced using specified control
measures identified as “highly cost-effective.”64 One such
control measure identified by the EPA was a cap-and-trade
system for electricity-generating and other large boilers and
59. See discussion infra Part I.C.
60. See discussion infra Part I.C.
61. The Clean Air Act grants EPA the authority to require states to revise
SIPs found to be inadequate under provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(k)(5).
62. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain
States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96) [hereinafter NOx SIP Call].
63. Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 673, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see
Patricia Ross McCubbin, Cap and Trade Programs Under the Clean Air Act:
Lessons from the Clean Air Interstate Rule and the NOx Sip Call, 18 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).
64. McCubbin, supra note 63, at 6. The EPA defined “highly cost-effective”
control measures as those that would cost no more on average than $2,000 per
ton of pollution reduced. NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377–78.
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turbines.65 The rule set each state’s significant contribution for
purposes of the good neighbor provision at the amount of
reduction obtainable by highly cost-effective control
measures.66
Eight affected states and numerous industrial entities
challenged the rule on a variety of grounds in Michigan v. U.S.
EPA.67 A majority of the court held, among other things, that
nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of the good
neighbor provision precluded the EPA from considering cost in
its definition of significant contribution.68 The eight states also
challenged the use of the EPA-defined highly cost-effective
control measures to calculate state emission budgets because
they intruded on states’ statutory rights to select their own
control measures.69 In rejecting this challenge, the court held
that, while the EPA relied on identified highly cost-effective
control measures to establish each state’s obligation, the rule
did not restrict the state’s discretion to meet that obligation by
any other combination of measures.70
2. The Clean Air Interstate Rule and North Carolina v. EPA
The EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule
(CAIR), the EPA’s second attempt to implement the good
neighbor provision, in 2005.71 CAIR called on twenty-eight
states and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs to
provide for reductions to sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxide
(NOx) emissions determined to contribute significantly to air
quality problems in downwind states.72
CAIR identified the obligations of covered upwind states in
two stages. First, based on environmental modeling, the EPA

65. NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,378.
66. Id.
67. McCubbin, supra note 63, at 7 (citing Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d
663, 667–68 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
68. Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d at 669, 676–79.
69. Id. at 686–87.
70. Id. at 688.
71. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions
to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified in
scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.) [hereinafter Clean Air Interstate Rule].
72. Id. at 25,167. NOx is an important precursor to ground-level ozone,
while both NOx and SO2 contribute to atmospheric formation of fine
particulate matter (PM2.5). Id.
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identified states that met certain thresholds for contribution to
downwind air quality degradation.73 Both CAIR and the NOx
SIP Call relied on output-based control rates for electric
generating units based on the number of pounds of NOx
emitted per million British thermal units of energy generated
Instead
of
relying
on
state-by-state
(lbs/mmBtu).74
determinations of actual contribution to set reduction targets,
however, CAIR took a regional approach.75 To determine the
regional NOx budget (the total amount of NOx to be eliminated
throughout the CAIR region), the EPA multiplied the combined
average annual heat input of all power plants in states above
the contribution threshold by the control rate, which was
determined to reflect implementation of “highly cost-effective”
control technology.76 The EPA then divided this budget among
the states according to each state’s contribution to the regional
total, modified based on the proportion of oil-, coal-, and gasfired plants within the state.77 EPA identified adjustment
factors of 1.0 for coal, 0.4 for gas, and 0.6 for oil, which were
intended to reflect the differing reduction burdens and
associated costs associated with each fuel type.78 CAIR called
for an initial NOx control rate to take effect in 2009, with a
more stringent limit slated for 2015.79 SO2 budgets were based
on the number of allowances issued under the existing Title IV
cap-and-trade program and were to be reduced by fifty percent
in 2010 and sixty-five percent in 2015.80
73. Id. at 25,191. A state met the threshold for PM2.5 contribution if
modeling determined the state’s downwind contribution amounted to at least
0.2 micrograms per cubic meter (g/m3), which is approximately one percent of
the relevant NAAQS. Id. The significance threshold for ozone was more
complicated. First, to be subject to CAIR a state’s contribution based on
modeling had to exceed two parts per billion (ppb). Id. Second, a state’s
relative contribution to a downwind area’s total concentration of ozone above
the NAAQS had to exceed one percent. Id. States that met both criteria were
then further evaluated based on the magnitude, frequency, and relative
amount of contribution to determine whether they significantly contributed to
downwind nonattainment. Id. at 25,191–92.
74. See NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,362 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.F. pts. 51, 71, 75, and 96); Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 25,176.
75. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,230.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 25,230–31.
78. Id. at 25,231.
79. Id. at 25,176.
80. Id. at 25,229.
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In the second stage, like the NOx SIP Call, CAIR left states
the option of whether to require the highly cost-effective
measures identified by the EPA or to submit SIPs containing
other measures that would result in the same levels of pollution
reduction.81 For states that chose to meet their obligations by
regulating electricity generating units, the rule created
optional cap-and-trade programs for NOx and SO2.82 The EPA
intended the trading programs to be consistent with and
expand upon existing regimes created pursuant to the NOx SIP
Call and the Title IV acid deposition program.83 While CAIR
was not projected to eliminate all interstate transport, the EPA
expected implementation of the rule to result in significant
economic, health, and other benefits at a relatively low cost.84
CAIR was similar in some respects to the NOx SIP Call, but
important differences ultimately proved fatal to the new rule.85
A number of states, electrical utilities, and other groups
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for review of CAIR on a variety of grounds,
consolidated in the case North Carolina v. EPA.86 The court
ultimately found the rule sufficiently flawed that it should be

81. Id. at 25,165.
82. Id. at 25,273–85.
83. Id. at 25,273. The rule required states that chose to regulate electric
generating units, but not to participate in the CAIR trading program, to retire
Title IV allowances in excess of their CAIR budgets. Id. at 25,259.
84. Id. at 25,165–66. EPA projected CAIR would result in attainment in
fifty-two of seventy-nine counties otherwise projected to be in nonattainment
for PM2.5 in 2010, and fifty-seven of seventy-four counties otherwise projected
to be in nonattainment for PM2.5 in 2015. Id. at 25,165. The Agency expected
attainment by three of forty counties otherwise projected to be in
nonattainment for eight-hour ozone in 2010, and six of twenty-two counties for
2015. Id. at 25,165–66. Expected health benefits related to reductions in PM2.5
included approximately 17,000 fewer premature fatalities, 8700 fewer cases of
chronic bronchitis, 22,000 fewer non-fatal heart attacks, 10,500 fewer hospital
admissions, and 1.7 million fewer work-loss days. Id. at 25,166. Projected
ozone-related benefits included 2800 fewer hospital admissions for respiratory
illnesses, 280 fewer emergency room admissions for asthma, 690,000 fewer
days with restricted activity levels, and 510,000 fewer days of missed school
due to child illness. Id. At full implementation in 2015, EPA projected the rule
would have quantifiable economic benefits ranging from $86.3 billion to $101
billion annually, at an estimated annual cost of between $2.6 billion and $3
billion. Id.
85. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 930 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g
granted in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
86. See generally id.; Elizabeth Kruse, Comment, North Carolina v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 283, 287 (2009).
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vacated in its entirety.87 Most important to the analysis in this
case are two elements of the decision: the court’s rejection of
CAIR’s cap-and-trade program88 and its methodology for
setting NOx and SO2 budgets.89
The court found that the cap-and-trade program, designed
to address upwind contribution to downwind air pollution on a
region-wide basis, failed to effectuate the mandate established
by the good neighbor provision.90 The court interpreted the
statutory language to create a duty to ensure that each state
addresses its own “significant contribution” to downwind
nonattainment.91 By allowing sources to purchase allowances
throughout the region, the EPA left open the possibility that a
state could achieve its CAIR budget without reducing its
transport to downwind states at all.92 The court held that
because the trading program failed to require reductions based
on each state’s quantified “significant contribution,” it exceeded
the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority.93
The court also held the EPA’s systems for establishing
state budgets for both NOx and SO2 to be arbitrary and
capricious.94 The court found that the EPA failed to adequately
establish a connection between CAIR’s percentage-based
reduction in the number of Title IV allowances each state
would receive and individual states’ “significant contribution”
under the good neighbor provision.95 Further, the court found
87. North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 930.
88. Id. at 903.
89. Id. at 916–21.
90. Id. at 907–08 (noting that the lawfulness of the cap-and-trade
program that survived Michigan v. U.S. EPA was never reviewed because it
was not challenged in that case).
91. Id. at 907–08 (“Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) prohibits sources ‘within the
State’ from ‘contribut[ing] significantly to nonattainment in . . . any other
State . . . .’ Yet under CAIR, sources in Alabama, which contribute to
nonattainment of PM2.5 NAAQS in Davidson County, North Carolina, would
not need to reduce their emissions at all. Theoretically, sources in Alabama
could purchase enough NOx and SO2 allowances to cover all their current
emissions, resulting in no change in Alabama’s contribution to Davidson
County, North Carolina’s nonattainment.” (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted)).
92. Id. at 907.
93. Id. at 908.
94. Id. at 918, 921.
95. Id. at 917–18 (“EPA . . . explains that it chose Title IV as a starting
point ‘to preserve the viability and emissions reductions of the highly
successful title IV program.’ This goal may be valid, but it is not among the
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the EPA’s identification of these reductions as achievable by
“highly cost-effective controls” inconsistent with the
consideration of cost approved in Michigan v. EPA.96 Michigan
approved the EPA’s use of cost to reduce a state’s obligation by
requiring elimination of only the portion of the state’s
emissions that could be achieved by implementing “highly costeffective controls.”97 The CAIR SO2 budgets, however, began by
establishing across-the-board, percentage-based reductions
targets based on historic Title IV allowances, which the EPA
then verified could be met by implementing controls identified
as “highly cost-effective.”98 The court found that an approach in
which the EPA simply “pick[s] a cost for a region, and deem[s]
‘significant’ any emissions that sources can eliminate more
cheaply . . . would
not
necessarily
achieve
something
measurable toward the goal of prohibiting sources ‘within the
State’
from
contributing
significantly
to
downwind
nonattainment.”99
The EPA’s allocation of NOx budgets was challenged for its
reliance on fuel-adjustment factors to allocate emission
allowances between states.100 The EPA likely intended the fueladjustment factors to create a more coherent application of its
“highly cost-effective controls” standard to different types of
power producers, by virtue of their taking into account the
variations in baseline emission rates and the cost, availability,
and potential reductions of measures associated with different
fuel types.101 The court found this approach an impermissible
objectives in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). And if it is somehow compatible with
states’ obligations to include ‘adequate provisions’ in their SIPs, prohibiting
emissions ‘within the State from . . . contribut[ing] significantly’ to downwind
nonattainment, then EPA should explain how. It has failed to do so.” (internal
citations omitted)).
96. Id. at 917.
97. Id. at 918 (citing Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 675 (D.C. Cir.
2000)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 916. Although petitioners did not directly challenge the regional
NOx budget, the court wrote that, as with the SO2 budgets, the EPA’s
approach did not tailor each state’s significant contribution to cost
considerations, but instead established a regionwide reduction target and then
determined the reductions to be achievable through highly cost-effective
control measures. Id. at 919.
101. See McCubbin, supra note 63, at 14–15 (“If EPA required all power
plants to emit no more than, say, 0.15 pounds of NOX per million Btus
(lbs/mmBtu), coal-fired power plants might have to spend as much as $2,000
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attempt to equitably distribute the burden of reducing NOx
emissions among upwind states.102 The court indicated
willingness to defer to reasonable EPA interpretations of what
constitutes a “significant contribution” under the good neighbor
provision, and reiterated the Michigan court’s holding that cost
can be considered as a factor of significance.103 The North
Carolina court made clear, however, that an interpretation
consistent with the statute “cannot extend so far as to make
one state’s significant contribution depend on another state’s
cost of eliminating emissions.”104 Each state must be
responsible for eliminating or reducing its own “significant
contribution” to downwind nonattainment or pollution;105 to
survive judicial scrutiny, any rule promulgated under the good
neighbor provision must not “require some states to exceed the
mark.”106
The court’s decision to vacate CAIR in its entirety shocked
all parties, even those opposed to portions of the rule, and
caused widespread concerns about the potential disruption and
regulatory uncertainty that would result.107 The EPA
petitioned the court for rehearing of the case, or, in the
alternative, remand without vacatur.108 The same three-judge
panel that had decided the original case agreed to the latter
request, determining that leaving the rule in place until the
EPA could promulgate a replacement “would at least

per ton of reduced emissions, whereas natural gas-fired plants would spend
less than half that. Or, putting it another way, if a natural gas-fired power
plant were required to spend $2,000 per ton of avoided NOX, its emissions rate
would be roughly 0.06 lbs/mmBtu, far lower than the rate of 0.15 lbs/mmBtu
achieved at a coal-fired facility for the same cost.” (citation omitted)).
102. North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 919–21.
103. Id. at 919.
104. Id. at 919–20.
105. Id. at 921.
106. Id.
107. Some of the parties that initially challenged CAIR pushed for its
reinstatement after this decision, and worried that the court had “thrown out
the baby with the bathwater.” Matthew D. Tait, Note, A Remedy Even the
Plaintiffs Don’t Like: The D.C. Circuit’s Vacatur of the Clean Air Interstate
Rule, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 552, 568 (2009) (discussing immediate
reactions from petitioners, industry representatives, and others to the
decision).
108. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacating
in part 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir.).
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temporarily preserve the environmental values covered by
CAIR.”109
II. EME HOMER CITY GENERATION, L.P. V. EPA
A. THE CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE

In August 2011 the EPA published the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (CSAPR).110 The Agency promulgated the new
rule in response to the decision in North Carolina, and
intended it to be consistent with the holding in that case.111
Like CAIR, CSAPR focuses primarily on large electric
generating units.112 Like both CAIR and the NOx SIP Call, the
rule uses a two-stage approach to identify covered states and to
determine their reduction obligations.113 First, the EPA
identified states whose measured emissions at any downwind
receptor exceeded a threshold amount, set at one percent of the
relevant NAAQS.114 A total of twenty-seven states met or
exceeded these threshold levels for one or more NAAQS.115 The
EPA then, using a multi-factor analysis taking into account
both air quality impact and cost, determined each state’s
emissions that were a significant contribution to
nonattainment or interference with maintenance.116 CSAPR
retained a limited role for emissions trading, but “the Rule also
maintain[ed] State-specific limits by means of assurance
provisions that ‘ensure that the necessary emission reductions
occur within each covered state.’”117 In a substantial departure
109. Id. at 1178.
110. CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97).
111. Id. at 48,211 (“EPA’s approach in the Transport Rule . . . is guided by
and consistent with the Court’s opinion in North Carolina . . . .”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 48,236. The EPA used threshold levels of 0.15 g/m3 for annual
PM2.5, 0.35 g/m3 for twenty-four-hour PM2.5, and 0.8 ppb for eight-hour ozone.
Id.
115. Id. at 48,209. Eighteen states met or exceeded the threshold level for
annual PM2.5. Id. at 48,240. Twenty-two states were included for 24-hour
PM2.5. Id. at 24,242. Twenty-six states exceeded threshold contributions for
ozone. Id. at 24,245.
116. Id. at 48,211.
117. Brief for Respondents at 10, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v.
EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1302) (quoting CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg.
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from its approach in the NOx SIP Call and CAIR, the EPA
issued FIPs concurrently with CSAPR.118 A number of states,
local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for review of CSAPR, arguing that the EPA
had exceeded the scope of its statutory authority.119
B. THE DECISION
On December 30, 2011, the court granted an order
temporarily staying CSAPR.120 The order instructed the EPA to
continue to administer CAIR pending a resolution of the
challenges to the new rule.121 On August 21, 2012, two
members of the three-judge panel held that the EPA had again
exceeded its statutory authority and the rule should thus be
vacated in its entirety.122 Judge Rogers issued a lengthy and
vigorous dissent, arguing that the court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case and that, even if the case were
appropriately before the court, the majority decided it
incorrectly.123
The majority, pointing primarily to the decision in North
Carolina and the text of the Clean Air Act, laid out three
requirements for any implementation of the good neighbor
provision to survive review.124 First, the EPA may not require a
48,208, 48,271 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and
97)).
118. CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208. CAIR gave states eighteen months to
submit SIPs complying with its requirements. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70
Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,263 (May 12, 2005). The EPA promulgated FIPs pursuant
to the rule about a year later, but made clear the FIPs were intended as a
“backstop” and that the agency did not intend to interfere with timely and
adequate SIPs. Federal Implementation Plans To Reduce Interstate Transport
of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,328, 25,341 (Apr. 28,
2006).
119. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
120. Id. at 19.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 37.
123. Id. at 38 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Notably, Judge Rogers sat on the
panels that decided both Michigan and North Carolina, while neither of the
two judges in the majority, Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Griffith, participated
in deciding either of the two previous cases interpreting the good neighbor
provision. See Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000); North
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
124. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 20–22.
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state to reduce more than its own “significant contribution.”125
If the EPA defines some level of contribution as insignificant,
the statute does not authorize the EPA to require emission
reductions that would reduce transport below that threshold.126
To require further reductions, the majority found, would be an
attempt to use the statute as “a blank check for EPA to address
interstate pollution on a regional basis without regard to an
individual upwind State’s actual contribution to downwind air
quality.”127 Second, each state’s required reduction must be
proportional, taking into account the magnitude of the
contribution relative to those of other upwind states and of the
affected downwind state.128 Specifically, the majority stated,
“the collective burden must be allocated among the upwind
States in proportion to the size of their contributions to the
downwind State’s nonattainment.”129 Third, the “end goal” of
the statute is attainment in downwind states, and the EPA
may not require more reductions than are necessary to meet
that goal.130 Any rule promulgated under the good neighbor
provision must not “produce more than necessary ‘over-control’
in the downwind States—that is, [the EPA must ensure] that
the obligations do not go beyond what is necessary for the
downwind States to achieve the NAAQS.”131
The majority held that by using a numerical threshold for
inclusion in the rule, the EPA established a “floor”—and any
level of transport below that threshold is presumptively not
“significant” for purposes of the good neighbor provision.132 By
then ignoring this “floor” when it considered cost to calculate
each state’s “significant contribution,” the EPA created the
possibility that a state “may be required to reduce its emissions
by an amount greater than the ‘significant contribution’ that
brought it into the program in the first place.”133 The majority
125. Id. at 20–22, 25.
126. Id. 20–22.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id. at 20.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 25. The court relied on North Carolina’s requirement that the
EPA cannot require some states to “exceed the mark.” Id. (citing North
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). The court determined by
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also found CSAPR inconsistent with the requirement of
proportionality “because it made no attempt to calculate
upwind States’ required reductions on a proportional basis that
took into account contributions of other upwind States to the
downwind States’ nonattainment problems.”134 Finally, the
majority held the EPA’s approach “failed to ensure” that the
aggregate reductions required of upwind states would not lead
to “over-control” in downwind states.135 The EPA “may not
require upwind States to do more than necessary for the
downwind States to achieve the NAAQS.”136
The majority also found fault with CSAPR’s issuance of
FIPs concurrently with the reduction requirements set forward
in the rule, rather than giving states an opportunity to satisfy
the requirements with SIPs and avoid direct federal
regulation.137 It based its conclusion that CSAPR exceeded the
EPA’s statutory mandate in this respect on the longstanding
notion that regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act is
firmly divided between the federal government and the
states.138 The EPA is responsible for promulgation of air quality
standards, but each state has “primary responsibility for
attaining those standards within its own borders.”139 The court
has interpreted this rule to create a strict “federalism bar” that
precludes the EPA from using the SIP process to require a state
to implement specific mitigation measures.140
The EPA argued CSPAR was justified by previous findings
setting a numerical threshold for conclusion, the EPA had defined the “mark.”
Id.
134. Id. at 26–27 (“To be sure, under Michigan, EPA may rely on costeffectiveness factors in order to allow some upwind States to do less than their
full fair share. But when EPA asks one upwind State to eliminate more than
its statutory fair share, that State is necessarily being forced to clean up
another upwind State’s share of the mess in the downwind State. Under the
statute and North Carolina, that is impermissible.” (internal citations
omitted)).
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 37.
138. Id. at 29.
139. Id. (citing Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63–67
(1975); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 600 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2010); and
Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1406–10 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
140. Id. (citing Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1046 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (citing Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 95
(1975); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Michigan v. U.S.
EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
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issued to the affected states for failures to either submit SIPs
or obtain EPA approval of SIP submissions.141 The majority
found, however, that states have no obligation under the good
neighbor provision until the EPA defines each state’s
“significant contribution”—the amount of pollution a state must
address in its SIP provision for the SIP to be acceptable.142 It
rejected arguments by the EPA that the good neighbor
provision contained in section 110 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, which lays out minimum requirements
for SIPs, creates an obligation for states to independently
include adequate provisions in SIPs to prohibit “pollution in
amounts which will ‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’
or ‘interfere with maintenance’ of the new NAAQS in a
downwind State.”143 The opinion points to prior EPA
statements suggesting that coherent implementation of the
good neighbor provision requires the EPA to first define state
obligations, and finds EPA rulemaking approaches consistent
with these statements in CAIR and the NOx SIP Call.144
141. Id. at 31.
142. Id. at 32 (“[T]he good neighbor obligation is not a clear numerical
target—far from it—until EPA defines the target. Even after EPA sets a
NAAQS, an upwind State’s good neighbor obligation for that pollutant is
nebulous and unknown. The statutory standard is ‘amounts’ of pollution which
will ‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’ or ‘interfere with maintenance’
of the new NAAQS in a downwind State. There is no way for an upwind State
to know its obligation without knowing levels of air pollution in downwind
States and then apportioning its responsibility for each downwind State’s
nonattainment. Therefore, the upwind State’s obligation remains impossible
for the upwind State to determine until EPA defines it. Without further
definition by EPA, a prohibition on ‘amounts which will . . . contribute
significantly’ is like a road sign that tells drivers to drive “carefully.” The
regulated entities—here, the upwind States—need more precise guidance to
know how to conform their conduct to the law. A SIP logically cannot be
deemed to lack a ‘required submission’ or deemed to be deficient for failure to
meet the good neighbor obligation before EPA quantifies the good neighbor
obligation.” (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
143. Id. The EPA argued that under Clean Air Act section 110(c)(1), it was
required here to promulgate a FIP within two years of finding a SIP deficient
in implementing the state’s good neighbor obligation. Id. at 30–31. See 42
U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2006).
144. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 34–36 (“The task of
determining the reductions necessary to meet section 110(a)(2)(D) involves
allocating the use of the downwind States’ air basin. This area is a commons in
the sense that the contributing State or States have a greater interest in
protecting their local interests than in protecting an area in a downwind State
over which they do not have jurisdiction and for which they are not politically
accountable. Thus, in general, it is reasonable to assume that EPA may be in a
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The majority ultimately found that, due to these flaws it
perceived in CSAPR, the appropriate remedy was vacatur and
remand to the EPA.145
C. THE MAJORITY DECISION IN EME HOMER CITY GENERATION
SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
1. Petitioners’ Objections to the EPA’s Interpretation of the
Good Neighbor Provision Were Not Properly Before the Panel
If the EPA chooses to appeal and the Supreme Court
agrees to hear the case, the Court will face difficult questions—
first and foremost is whether the panel should have heard key
arguments in the case at all.
In her dissent, Judge Rogers argues that neither the
statutory objections to the EPA’s definition of each state’s
obligations under CSAPR nor the issue of the EPA’s decision to
utilize FIPs were properly preserved for review.146 Judge
Rogers argues that the limitations on judicial review imposed
by Clean Air Act sections 307(b)(1) and 307(d)(7)(B) exist for
two important reasons: “[T]o enforce repose so that the
rulemaking process is not crippled by surprise challenges to
matters that were rightfully presumed settled, and to
guarantee an agency’s expert consideration and possible
correction of any flaws in its rules before the matter reaches a
court.”147 The statutory filing period created by section
307(b)(1), she argues, has been strictly construed as
“jurisdictional in nature”—if petitioners fail to comply with it,
the court cannot address their claims.148 Judge Rogers cites a
better position to determine the appropriate goal, or budget, for the
contributing States, while leaving [it] to the contributing States’ discretion to
determine the mix of controls to make the necessary reductions.” (emphasis
added by the court) (quoting NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,370 (Oct.
27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96))).
145. Id. at 37–38.
146. Id. at 38–40 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 38 (emphasis in original).
148. Id. at 40 (quoting Med. Waste Inst. & Energy Recovery Council v.
EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see also Slinger Drainage, Inc. v.
EPA, 237 F.3d 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has explained
that ‘judicial review provisions are jurisdictional in nature and must be
construed with strict fidelity to their terms. This is all the more true of
statutory provisions specifying the timing of review, for those time limits are,
as we have often stated, mandatory and jurisdictional, and are not subject to
equitable tolling.’” (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Stone v.
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long line of cases for the proposition that section 307(d)(7)(B)’s
requirement that any objection be raised “with reasonable
specificity during the public comment period” is equally
important, and has thus been interpreted very strictly,
especially when the challenge at issue is to an agency’s
interpretation of its governing statute.149
The majority relies on two comments, the decision in North
Carolina v. EPA and the administrative record in that earlier
case, to support its conclusion that the statutory challenges to
CSAPR’s reduction obligations were adequately preserved for
review.150 The comments cited by the majority, which were
submitted by Tennessee and Wisconsin during the notice and
comment rulemaking process, do not raise the statutory
objection addressed by the court.151 The majority finds,
however, that the comments were reasonably specific under the
particular circumstances of CSAPR’s promulgation to give the
EPA notice that they might provide the basis for a challenge in
court.152
The majority argues that, because the EPA promulgated
CSAPR directly in response to the District of Columbia
Circuit’s remand in North Carolina and its instruction to craft
a new rule “consistent with our opinion,” the EPA was aware of
that decision—specifically, the requirement that once the EPA
defines each upwind state’s “significant contribution,” it may
not “require some states to exceed the mark.”153 As Judge
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
149. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 52 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2011)); see also Cement Kiln Recycling
Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“While there are surely
limits on the level of congruity required between a party’s arguments before
an administrative agency and the court, respect for agencies’ proper role in the
Chevron framework requires that the court be particularly careful to ensure
that challenges to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute are first
raised in the administrative forum.” (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
U.S. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1994))).
150. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 24 n.18.
151. See id. at 53 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“[Tennessee’s] comment does not
suggest
that
EPA
is
statutorily
barred
from
following
its
approach . . . Wisconsin’s comment also does not demonstrate the statutory
authority challenge now advanced by petitioners in this court was
preserved.”).
152. Id. at 24–25 n.18 (majority opinion).
153. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir.
2008)).

DOOLEY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/12/2013 12:03 PM

EME HOMER CITY GENERATION, L.P. V. EPA

915

Rogers points out, however, the North Carolina court expressly
left the specific approach challenged here—the EPA’s twopronged analysis to determine initial inclusion in its rule and
each state’s obligations—undisturbed.154 The majority also
points to the EPA’s dismissal of a similar comment during the
development of the Clean Air Interstate Rule.155 The majority
argues the rejection of a similar argument in a prior
rulemaking was “highly relevant.”156 Judge Rogers argues
inclusion of this comment in the record is suspect for a number
of reasons. First, the comment was not introduced to the
present case until rebuttal oral argument.157 Furthermore, in
American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. EPA, the EPA had
incorporated the prior rulemaking docket into the record of the
regulation at issue, which was something that was not done in
this case.158 Finally, like the comments submitted during the
CSAPR rulemaking, the previous comment expressed a policy
preference, not a direct challenge to the EPA’s statutory
authority.159 Because the EPA was never given an opportunity
during the comment period to directly address the statutory
challenge at issue in this case, Judge Rogers argues, the
question was not properly preserved for review.160
Judge Rogers’ arguments are persuasive. The problems
with the majority’s reach for jurisdiction are evident in the
conditional language used in its decision: “[U]nder the Rule, a
State then may be required to reduce its emissions by an
amount greater than the ‘significant contribution’ that brought
it into the program in the first place.”161 This language reflects
the failure of petitioners to submit any modeling projections or
other data to support the conclusion that such a result would

154. Id. at 54–55 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing North Carolina v. EPA, 531
F.3d 896, 916–17 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
155. Id. at 24–25 n.18.
156. Id. (citing Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
157. Id. at 55 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“This comment . . . cannot carry the
weight the court assigns to it . . . .”).
158. Id. at 56 (“The CAIR comment that EPA rejected in the other
rulemaking is therefore not ‘the same argument’ that petitioners belatedly
attempt to raise now.”); see also Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 52 F.3d
1113, 1120 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
159. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 56 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 57.
161. Id. at 25 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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actually occur.162 Petitioners instead relied on simplistic
hypotheticals that fail to adequately communicate the
complexity and fundamentally regional nature of the
problem.163 If the issue had been properly raised during the
comment period, the EPA could have directly analyzed it.164
Even without direct study, the EPA determined that record
evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the feared result
would be “extremely unlikely” under the rule.165 Despite any
concrete evidence to the contrary, the majority accepts the
hypothetical risk of over-regulation presented by petitioners as
sufficient justification to send the EPA back to the drawing
board.
2. The Panel’s Decision Imposes an Overly Restrictive
Interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision That Is Not
Required by the Statute
Even if the court finds the challenges to CSAPR were
within the court’s jurisdiction, the challenges should be
rejected. In addition to the requirement that the EPA consider
any quantified threshold contribution for inclusion in a rule a
floor for significance, the panel decision creates two new
restrictions on the EPA’s authority.
First, the majority bases its establishment of both its
threshold-as-floor and proportionality requirements in
language included in the North Carolina court’s discussion of
state NOx budgets under CAIR.166 At issue there was the EPA’s
decision, after setting a regional NOx budget based on the
product of the total regional heat input of all power plants and
a control emissions rate the EPA determined was achievable by
all power plants via implementation of “highly cost-effective”
controls, to determine state-by-state allocations of trading
allowances based on a fuel-adjustment factor.167 The court
162. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 33.
163. For an example of such a hypothetical, see Final Brief of Industry and
Labor Petitioners at 22–23, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696
F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1302).
164. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 33–34 n.20 (“Due to the
lack of comments, this was not an issue that EPA analyzed in a direct fashion
for the Rule.”).
165. Id. at 33.
166. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 20–22.
167. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 918–19 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g granted
in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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determined this system, which granted more allowances to
states with a higher proportion of coal-fired power plants, was
an impermissible attempt to equitably distribute the burden of
reducing pollution among upwind states.168 There was a very
real danger that some states would “share the burden of
reducing other upwind states’ emissions.”169 Because CAIR
relied exclusively on a regional trading system, the court found
that “[t]he net result will be that states with mainly oil- and
gas-fired [electric generating units (EGUs)] will subsidize
reductions in states with mainly coal-fired EGUs.”170 This
approach was held contrary to the statute, which “requires
each state to prohibit emissions ‘within the State’ that
contribute significantly to downwind pollution, not to pay for
other states to prohibit their own contributions.”171 CSAPR
presents no such difficulties. Each state is required to reduce
emissions “within the state” in accordance with its own
“significant contribution,” as defined by the EPA in the rule.172
While CSAPR retains a limited role for emissions trading, “the
Rule also maintains State-specific limits by means of assurance
provisions that ‘ensure that the necessary emission reductions
occur within each covered state,’”173 and the trading provisions
were not challenged.174 The majority here, however, would
stretch the language applied by the North Carolina court to
effectively create a restrictive definition of “significant
contribution.”175 This may be a logical extension of the holding
in North Carolina. It is certainly one reasonable interpretation

168. Id. at 921 (“Because the fuel-adjustment factors shifted the burden of
emission reductions solely in pursuit of equity among upwind states—an
improper reason—the resulting state budgets were arbitrary and capricious.”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2006)).
172. See CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,211 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97) (“EPA believes this methodology [in
CSAPR] addresses the [North Carolina] court’s concern that the approach
used in CAIR was insufficiently state-specific.”).
173. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 10 (quoting CSAPR, 76 Fed.
Reg. 48,208, 48,271 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78,
and 97)).
174. The court in EME Homer City Generation opines that “interstate
trading is generally permitted.” EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA,
696 F.3d 7, 18 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
175. See id. at 25 n.19.
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of the statutory text, but it is not, as the majority suggests, one
that is demanded by the statute.
The majority cites no authority for its position that “the
end goal of [section 110 of the Clean Air Act] is attainment in
the downwind State.”176 It also, somewhat ironically,
completely neglects in its discussion of potential overregulation the “interference with maintenance” prong of the
good neighbor provision, which the court in North Carolina
expressly instructed the EPA to give independent effect in any
replacement rule.177 The EPA designed its rule and defined
each state’s significant contribution based on the complicated
relationships between states.178 Most upwind states contribute
to pollution in multiple downwind states, and most downwind
states are affected by multiple upwind states.179 Many states
are both “upwind” and “downwind” for purposes of the good
neighbor provision; they both contribute to other states’
pollution problems and suffer from problems caused by out-ofstate pollution.180
The EME Homer City Generation majority acknowledges
that “there may be some truly unavoidable over-control in some
downwind States that occurs as a byproduct of the necessity of
reducing upwind States’ emissions enough to meet the NAAQS
in other downwind States.”181 The majority opinion fails,
however, to offer any insight as to how the EPA might craft an
effective and practicable rule in line with the new restrictions
the decision places on the Agency. The EPA’s approach is a
reasonable attempt to effectuate the Clean Air Act’s good
neighbor provision, and to address the complex web of linkages
between upwind and downwind states. The statutory language
is sufficiently ambiguous that a reasonable interpretation by
the EPA should be afforded deference.182
176. Id. at 20.
177. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 910–11 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g granted
in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
178. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 37–38.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 22 .
182. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (holding that where an agency’s governing statute is silent or
ambiguous as to a given issue, an agency interpretation is entitled to
deference as long as the interpretation is based on a permissible construction
of the statute).
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3. The Challenge to EPA’s Issuance of FIPs was Both
Improperly Reached and Incorrectly Decided as a Matter
of Statutory Interpretation
Judge Rogers argues that the court’s decision to address
objection to CSAPR’s utilization of FIPs was similarly
inappropriate.183 Affected states were put on notice of the
EPA’s express intent to issue a FIP within two years of when
the agency published findings of their failure to submit
adequate SIPs.184 The proper time to object to promulgation of
a FIP, Judge Rogers asserts, was within sixty days of that
publication.185
Again, even if the court finds the decision to hear the case
was appropriate, the majority advances as mandatory an
interpretation of the relevant statutory language that has no
textual basis. The majority’s interpretation would create a
distinct process, initiated by EPA rulemaking to define each
state’s “significant contribution,” that requires states to first
submit a SIP containing provisions to address transport.186
This is not how the statute is written. Every state, in every
SIP, is required to provide “adequate . . . provisions” to satisfy
the requirements of the good neighbor statute.187 Upon a
finding of failure to submit an adequate SIP, the EPA is
required, within two years, to promulgate a FIP unless the
state addresses the deficiencies.188
While it may be preferable from a cooperative federalism
standpoint to allow states a first attempt at any targeted
reductions, this is not required by the statute. The majority
would replace the language and structure of the statute with
its own policy-based rule.189 The FIP provisions are intended to
address state failure to act. In issuing its findings of failure to
submit adequate SIPS and in promulgating CSAPR, the EPA
183. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 43 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he court reaches the merits of this issue despite its lack of jurisdiction.”).
184. Id. at 41 (citing Failure to Submit Good Neighbor SIP Finding, 75 Fed
Reg. 32,673, 32,674 (June 9, 2010)).
185. Id. at 41–42.
186. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
187. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 47 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 46.
189. Id. at 48 (“The court’s ‘role is not to correct the text so that it better
serves the statute’s purposes . . . .’” (quoting Va. Dep’t of Med. Assistance
Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 678 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir.
2012)).
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made a determination, within its statutory authority, that the
failure of states to adequately address transport issues
warranted direct federal intervention.
Allowing the majority decision in EME Homer City
Generation to stand would significantly limit the EPA’s ability
to address the fundamentally regional problem of interstate air
pollution. The rules outlined by the court severely curtail the
EPA’s discretion to define what constitutes each state’s
significant contribution to downwind pollution by requiring the
EPA to tailor each state’s obligation to its precise, proportional
share of the quantity of pollution above a downwind attainment
threshold.190 The decision allows for costs to be considered, but
only after defining a state’s baseline obligation determined by
the aforementioned criteria. This would effectively leave the
EPA three options: 1) impose incredibly burdensome, if not
unachievable, obligations on certain states;191 2) require only
minimal reductions and leave a large portion of the problem
unaddressed; or 3) rely on alternative Clean Air Act provisions
that address the problem in a piecemeal fashion and have
otherwise proved ineffective.192 If the decision and its
restrictive reading of the good neighbor provision are allowed to
stand, the Clean Air Act must then be amended to allow for
meaningful regulation of interstate air pollution.
CONCLUSION
The majority decision in EME Homer City Generation
imposes an unnecessarily burdensome reading of the Clean Air
Act’s good neighbor provision that drastically curtails the
ability of the EPA to address interstate air pollution. The
decision should be overturned and CSAPR implemented for two
reasons. First, the majority reached key issues despite a failure
by petitioners to adequately raise and preserve the issues
during the relevant notice and comment rulemaking period.
Second, the majority based its decision on questionable

190. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 13 (“From a technical
perspective, EPA explained why an air quality-only approach . . . would not be
an effective or efficient overall response to the complex collective-contribution
problem presented here, and this analysis stands essentially undisputed.”).
191. Id. at 29 (“[T]he resulting limitations in certain States would be so
onerous as to make the control regime practically unworkable.”).
192. For a discussion of the Clean Air Act’s statutory structure and its
effectiveness, see supra notes 16–52 and accompanying text.
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readings of the relevant statutory language and failed to grant
the EPA the deference it is due under well-established
principles of statutory interpretation. If the decision is allowed
to stand, the Clean Air Act must be amended to give the EPA
adequate discretion to achieve the statute’s goal.

